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TAXATION: STATE TRANSACTION PRIVILEGE TAX:
AN INTERFERENCE WITH TRIBAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT
Sharon E. Claassen
On the surface, the basic theory involving state taxation of
Indians and Indian property appears relatively simple. Indians
and Indian property could not be taxed by the state unless the
state had been given the express power to do so. Only Congress
could grant such power to the state. Indian property outside of
the reservation, however, was subject to the state taxing power
unless Congress had provided some form of applicable exemp-
tion. 1 The problems with this theory are twofold, i.e., determin-
ing the intent of congressional action or inaction in the area and
defining what activities or enterprises are on the reservation or
off the reservation. As the tribes moved from an isolated reserva-
tion existence and became involved in exchanges with surround-
ing state communities, a large area of uncertainty evolved.
Increased interaction between tribes and state citizens raised taxa-
tion issues that had not been specifically addressed by Congress.
Given the lack of direct congressional guidance, the courts
were left to create their own doctrines upon which to decide state
taxation issues.' Courts historically trudged through the cases
overcoming or circumventing each obstacle as it arose. What has
developed, therefore, is a hodgepodge of law that offers little
guidance for either the state or the tribe.3
One of the more notable doctrines that developed in the area
was the doctrine of "federal instrumentality." -This concept
actually originated in the case of M'Culloch v. Maryland in
1819." The doctrine determined that certain activities were exempt
from state taxation because they were important in furthering the
objectives of the federal government. Private parties could claim
1. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 254 (1942).
2. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (D.N.M. 1977).
"The whole area of state jurisdiction over non-Indians doing business with Indians on
Indian lands deserves Congressional review and the enactment of definitive federal legisla-
tion. In their absence, the courts can only cope with each fact situation that arises within
a framework of fragmentary legislation. Further the scope of the problem is such that it
does not lend itself to resolution by the process of piece-meal adjudication. Yet this is
precisely what must happen in the absence of Congressional action." Id. at 1074.
3. Barsh, Issues in Federal, State and Tribal Taxation of Reservation Wealth: A
Survey and Economic Critique, 54 WASH. L. REv. 531, 533 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Barsh].
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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this exemption upon proof that their function qualified as a
"federal instrumentality." ' This doctrine was transposed to
Indian law in 1903 in the case of United States v. Richert6 :
The doctrine in its application to Indians and Indian pro-
perty is founded upon the premise that the power and duty of
governing and protecting tribal Indians is primarily a federal
function and that a state cannot impose a tax which will
substantially impede or burden the functioning of the Federal
Government. 7
One of the primary uses of this doctrine was to foreclose any
state taxation of non-Indian leaseholders of Indian lands.' As the
development of Indian lands increased, especially in mineral and
oil and gas exploitation, this exemption came under close scrutiny
by the courts. The states argued that non-Indian leaseholders
were wrongfully avoiding valid state taxation and thus the non-
Indian leaseholders and not the Indians were benefited. The
courts agreed and in 1949 they rejected the federal instrumentali-
ty exemption from state taxes as it applied to non-Indian lessees .
The federal instrumentality doctrine continued to lose its in-
fluence until, for all practical purposes, it was pronounced
dead."
The demise of the instrumentality doctrine opened the door for
state taxation encroachment on Indian tribes. A new wave of
cases appeared that exposed the vehicle of this encroachment-
the tax on gross receipts, usually in the form of a transaction
privilege tax.'1 The tax in question is levied on the privilege of
engaging in certain activities within the state. It usually includes
the performance of services, including construction. 2 The tax is
not levied on the sale or service, but it is measured by the gross
receipts of the sale or service. 3 The obligation created by the
5. Note, The Ninth Circuit's Federal instrumentality Doctrine-A Threat to Tribal
Sovereignty, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 358, 359 (1942).
6. 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
7. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 254, 255 (1942).
8. Choctaw & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914).
9. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas, 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
10. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
11. ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 42-1301 to 42-1362 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
72-16A (Supp. 1975). These two statutes are examples of this tax. Most of the litigation
discussed herein involved one of these two jurisdictions.
12. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 42-1310(i) (Supp. 1979).




transaction privilege tax is incurred only by the person or cor-
poration doing business in the state. 4
The implementation of this tax has created a figurative mine
field for Indian tribes and those engaging in business with the
tribes. This note will trace the development of case law in the
area. The study is centered on the application of the transaction
privilege tax to non-Indian contractors doing business on Indian
lands. The resulting effects upon the development of the Indian
tribes will be considered. Finally, the note will discuss tribal
actions that potentially could offset the effects of the transaction
privilege tax.
Non-Indians Doing Business With Indians
The problem in the area of state tax litigation where non-
Indians engaged in business with Indians was summarized by
Judge Bratton in the case of Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
O'Cheskey. 15
This case has presented one aspect of a problem that is with
increasing frequency facing the courts. On one side are the
Indians, subject to the plenary power of Congress. On the
other side are the states, anxious to control what transpires
within their borders and to raise revenues from whatever
source they can. There is currently strong Indian resistance to
any state effort to exert control over or to tax non-Indians do-
ing business with Indians. There is an equally strong effort by
the states to fill with state laws any void existing by virtue of
Congress's failure to enact governing legislation. Between them
stand the courts, hampered by Congressional inaction on the
subject.1,
One of the earlier cases involving the application of a state
transaction privilege tax (sometimes referred to as an excise tax) 7
to a non-Indian doing business with Indians was Warren Trading
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission. ' 8 The state of Arizona had
14. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 42-1309 (Supp. 1979), as interpreted by New Cornelia Co-op
Mercantile Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 533 P.2d 84 (Ariz. 1975).
15. 439 F. Supp. 1063 (D.N.M. 1977).
16. Id. at 1074.
17. It is important to remember that for the purposes of this paper, "excise" tax will
refer only to the transaction privilege tax. The term "excise tax" has been held to be
synonymous with "privilege" or "license" tax. See American Airways v. Wallace, 57
F.2d 877, 880 (D. Tenn. 1932).
18. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
1979]
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levied an excise tax on the "gross proceeds of sales or gross
income" of the trader.' 9 The trader had been granted a license to
operate a retail business on the Navajo Indian Reservation. The
United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs had issued the
license pursuant to Section 261 of Title 25 of the United States
Code (1958). The Court held that the federal regulation of Indian
traders was so comprehensive that the federal government had in
fact preempted the area. Therefore, the Arizona excise tax could
not be applied to Indian traders. "0
In Warren Trading Post the Court noted that if this state excise
tax was allowed to stand, it would place economic burdens on the
traders or the Indians. The excise tax would be in addition to any
taxes either the tribes or Congress imposed in this area. The
Court concluded that a state tax could increase prices and this
was. not in accord with the congressional plan to "protect Indians
against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable." 2 This benevolent
language did not include any mention of the "infringement test"
established in Williams v. Lee. 2 The Court did allude to the
unacceptability of federal, state, and tribal regulations all impos-
ing economic burdens in this area. However, the Court avoided
any discussion of state infringement on the tribal government. If
the Court was equating economic burden with the tribe's ability
to govern itself, then possibly an infringement argument could be
made against the tax. Given the glancing. treatment by the Court
and the inclusion of protective intent, however, such an argument
would be tenuous at best.
In 1975, Matheson v. Kinnear, a cigarette tax case, was decided."
The case, though addressing the validity of a sales tax, raised a
relevant question. The petitioner argued that his land, upon
which the business was located, was exempt from taxation and
therefore his business was also exempt. Petitioner, whose land
was exempted from state taxation," further argued that the
language of Section 412(1) specifically designated such lands as
19. ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 42-1309, 42-1312 (1956). Both sections have since been
amended, Amiz. REv. STAT. §§ 42-1309, 42-1312 (Supp. 1979).
20. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
21. Id.
22. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959): "Essentially, absent governing Acts
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right
of res.-rvation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
23. 383 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 412(a) (1970). This section also provides an exception for certain




"federal instrumentalities." He noted that in Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, the Court had held that 25 U.S.C. § 46525 did not
exempt the activity carried out on the land even though the land
itself was exempt. Section 465 did not designate the exempt lands
as federal instrumentalities. Therefore, he concluded that the
land involved in Mescalero was not a federal instrumentality and
thus neither was the activity carried thereon. Conversely, as 25
U.S.C. § 412(a) did designate the land as a federal instrumen-
tality, the activity thereon was also so classified and thus exempt
from state tax.
The Court disagreed, holding that land covered under both
Section 412(a) and Section 465 qualified as federal instrumen-
talities. However, the Court emphasized that the decision rested
on the fact that the phrase "federal instrumentality" pertained
only to the land and not to the business activities conducted on
the land.2 6 The Court also reiterated the general rule that tax ex-
emptions cannot be granted by implication.27 Therefore, cigarette
sales on petitioner's lands were not exempt from state taxation.28
This innovative argument illustrated the fact that merely
because the courts denounce a once established legal theory, this
does not prevent the reappearance of the theory in a slightly dif-
ferent context.29 Matheson v. Kinnear firmly established the rule
that the court would not find a tax exemption solely because the
activity in question occurred on tax-exempt land.30 The activity
itself must qualify for the exemption. This was to develop into a
significant obstacle in the cases involving non-Indian contractors
working on Indian land.
In 1976 the first of a series of non-Indian contractor suits
4reached the courts. G. M. Shupe, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, in-
volved a non-Indian Washington contractor who was employed
to construct the Nambe Pueblo Dam on the Nambe Pueblo
Reservation.3 1 The plaintiff in this case appealed the imposition
25. The section discussed in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973),
provides that: "any lands or rights acquired pursuant to [the 1934 Act] shall be taken in
the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe.. . for which the land is ac-
quired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation." 25
U.S.C. § 465 (1970).
26. Matheson v. Kinnear, 393 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
27. Id. at 1033. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 156 (1973);
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365-66 (1949).
28. Matheson v. Kinnear, 393 F. Supp. 1025, 1033 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
29. See text accompanying note 10, supra.
30.' Matheson v. Kinnear, 393 F. Supp. 1024 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
31. 550 P.2d 277 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).
1979]
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of the New Mexico gross receipts tax.12 The court dismissed the
argument that New Mexico lacked the jurisdiction to impose this
tax. The court noted numerous decisions that had held that "ac-
tivities by non-Indians on Indian land have generally been held
not exempt from state taxation." 3
There were, however, two issues that were determinative as to
the validity of the state excise tax. The first issue involved the
federal preemption doctrine established in Warren Trading Post
Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission. 4 The court found that the
substantial federal regulation present in Warren Trading Post was
absent in this case. The plaintiff offered the alternative argument
that. even if comprehensive federal regulations did not exist, the
state excise tax on the holder of a federal contract frustrated
federal Indian policies. This the court viewed as a "federal in-
strumentality" argument. In essence the contractor was alleging
that the performance of the contract was in furtherance of a
federal policy to develop Indian lands. This argument, the court
held, "has been rejected in numerous federal instrumentality
cases." 5
The second issue the court explored involved the possible in-
fringement on the Indians' rights of self-government. The court
turned to the test of Williams v. Lee,36 noting that this test ap-
plied in conflicts between state and tribal interests.3 7 The court
found no infringement. The Nambe Indians had not employed
the contractor nor were they paying him. The contractor had
been employed by the United States Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Reclamation.38 Furthermore, the court noted that the
Nanlbe Indians had not asserted tax jurisdiction over the activity
in question. Under these circumstances, no direct financial
32. Id. at 278.
33. Id. at 279.
34. 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965). See also text accompanying note 20, supra.
35. G.M. Shupe, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 550 P.2d 277, 279-80 (N.M. Ct. App.
1976).
36. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See note 22, supra.
37. G.M. Shupe, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 550 P.2d 277, 279-80 (N.M. Ct. App.
1976), citing McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973): "It must be
remembered that cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations in-
volving non-Indians. . . . In these situations, both the tribe and the State could fairly
claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed
to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point
where tribal self-government would be affected."





burden would be sustained by the Nambe Indians and the tax was
held valid.
Department of Revenue v. Hane Construction Co. also involved
an out-of-state non-Indian contractor." The state of Arizona had
imposed its excise tax on the gross receipts the contractor received
from work on canals located on the Colorado River Indian Reser-
vation. Hane had come to the state solely for the purpose of
fulfilling this contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The
court held that although there were significant federal regulations
that applied to this type of contract, these regulations had
specifically recognized the possibility of an applicable state tax.4"
In determining the issue of infringement, the court noted that the
contractor could not legally pass the tax on to the tribe. Even if
this had occurred, in this case the project was funded by public,
not tribal, monies. The only possible result could be that there
would be fewer BIA funds available to the tribe and the court
found this to be too remote to establish infringement.41
A possible solution to the problem involved in the developing
line of cases is suggested by Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
O'Cheskey. 2 This case can be divided into two decisions: the first
may provide a method for future use, the second points out the
problems still to be overcome. The state of New Mexico had im-
posed its excise tax on certain non-Indian contractors working on
projects on the Mescalero reservation. The tribe had entered into
an indemnity agreement with all the contractors which provided
for reimbursement if such an excise tax should be assessed.43
The first part of the case to be considered involved Quiller
Construction Company. Quiller was employed to build 100
houses. This employment involved a complex series of contracts
and agreements that included the tribe, the Mescalero Apache
Tribe Housing Authority (an agency of the tribe), OGO (a
California firm that planned the project and arranged financing),
and Quiller.4 ' The court examined the various documents and
held that Quiller was in fact an agent of the tribe. This agency,
the court continued, exempted Quiller from the state excise tax
imposed on the purchase of materials. This was based on the
39. 564 P.2d 932 (Ariz. 1977).
40. Id. at 934.
41. Id.
42. 439 F. Supp. 1063 (D.N.M. 1977).
43. Id. at 1066.
44. Id. at 1069-70.
1979]
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evidence that all materials ordered by Quiller were billed to the
tribe. It was irrelevant that Quiller had been made the tribe's
agent to avoid the excise tax. The tax exemption was not held to
include monies received by Quiller for its services rendered on the
housing project."
While the agency theory appears to be a method by which
tribes can avoid the imposition of state excise taxes on their con-
tracts with non-Indians, it has a major limitation. The tax did not
apply to the materials purchased by Quiller as the tribe's agent
because the New Mexico statute exempts sales of tangible per-
sonal property to an Indian tribe."" This exemption was the basis
for the court's avoidance of the excise tax as to the materials.47
The second part of this decision involved the application of the
excise tax to the services rendered by non-Indian contractors. In
deciding this issue, the court noted that while the legal incidence
of the tax is upon the contractors -only, it will in, reality be passed
to the purchaser. This was inevitable in this case because the tribe
had entered into agreements to reimburse the contractors should
the tax be imposed. Despite this, the court held this to be nothing
more than an indirect burden on the tribe. 8
At the time the services in question were performed, the tribe
had enacted its own gross receipts tax and licensing ordinances. It
should be noted that in G. M. Shupe,"9 the court had considered
the absence of such tribal legislation when it determined that the
excise tax did not constitute infringement on tribal self-
government.5 0 Faced with the existence of an identical tribal tax,
the court held that there was no infringement. The justification
for this ruling apparently involved the benefits by and protection
from the state that had been utilized by the contractors as they
traveled to and from the reservation.'
The court continued to reject the preemption arguments of the
tribe. The fact that the tribe was organized under the Indian
Reorganization Act 2 did not support the preemption theory. The
45. Id. at 1071.
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-14.9 (Supp. 1975).
47. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1070-71 (D.N.M.
1977).
48. Id. at 1072.
49. G.M. Shupe, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 550 P.2d 277, 280 (N.M. Ct. App.
1976).
50. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
51. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (D.N.M. 1977).




court acknowledged that the purpose of this Act was to en-
courage tribal development but held that this development was
not affected where only an economic burden falls on the tribe.
The legal incidence of the tax, ruled the court, does not fall on
the tribe, therefore no preemption. 3
In 1978 two Arizona cases were decided that considered the
state's excise tax. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker in-
volved a non-Indian carrier that had contracted with the tribe to
sell, load, and transport lumber on the reservation. " The state
had imposed an excise tax on the carrier's services, which, with
few exemptions, were carried out only on roads built by the BIA,
the tribe, or the carrier itself." Despite the fact the carrier's ac-
tivities were totally upon the reservation under direct contract
with the tribe, the court held that the tax applied because the
reservation was contained within the state boundaries.56 The fact
that the tribe would ultimately pay the $9,000 annual tax did not
constitute infringement. 7 Merely because the economic burden
will ultimately fall on a "non-tax-paying entity," the court
stated, will not invalidate the state tax." Indeed, because the tribe
had agreed to pay the excise tax if imposed, it had placed itself in
the position of a "mere volunteer" and therefore could not com-
plain."
The second Arizona case, Arizona Tax Commission v. Central
Machinery Co., 60 was decided by the Arizona Supreme Court sit-
ting en banc. The court held that the state excise tax applied to
the plaintiff, reversing the district court ruling. Plaintiff was a
non-Indian farm equipment seller. The activity in question in-
volved a sale of eleven tractors to Gila River Farms, an enterprise
of the Gila River Indian Community.61 The tax amounted to
$2,916.62 and was included in the total sales price of $100,137.26.
Although the plaintiff had not obtained a federal license, the
53. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (D.N.M. 1977).
54. 585 P.2d 891, 894 (Ariz. 1978).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 896.
57. Id. at 899.
58. Id. at 897.
59. Id.
60. 589 P.2d 426 (Ariz. 1978).
61. "The Gila River Indian Community is an Indian Entity existing under the
authority of 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq." Id.
19791
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superintendent of the agency could have excluded it from con-
ducting business on the reservation.62
]'he court rejected plaintiff's argument that it was an Indian
trader within the meaning of Warren Trading Post. " There was
no federal preemption and the tax applied. This, the court noted,
was sufficient to uphold the tax. The court felt compelled to re-
ject the "ultimate burden" argument, however, and reiterated
that merely because the Indians would sustain the economic
burden, this did not make the plaintiff immune from the state
tax.
64
Both of the above discussed Arizona decisions have been ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.6 It will be the first
time the Supreme Court has addressed the question of the ap-
plication of a state transaction privilege tax to non-Indians doing
business with Indians since Warren Trading Post was decided in
1965. The cases are being considered together.66 It will be in-
teresting to see whether the fact that White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker7 was filed by the tribe itself will affect the
Court's decision. It is unfortunate that neither of the tribes in-
volved appear to have implemented tribal legislation in this area.
The key issues raised by the cases appear to be: (1) What is an In-
dian trader within the meaning of Warren Trading Post?68 (2) If
the "ultimate burden" of the tax fails upon the tribe, can the tax
be held not to infringe on tribal self-government?
The Effect on the Tribes
It becomes apparent from a reading of the cases that a strong
presumption exists in favor of the state's ability to tax anyone
engaging in business within that state's boundaries. Judge Sutin,
especially concurring in 0. M, Shupe, Inc. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 9 stated that: "Where the activity of the Indians
obstructs the operation of state laws and is inconsistent with the
political welfare of the state and the social advantage of its
62. Id. at 427.
63. Warrent Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
64. State v. Central Machinery Co., 589 P.2d 426, 427 (Ariz. 1978).
65. 100 S.Ct. 41 (1979) (oral arguments set).
66. Id.
67. 585 P.2d 891 (Ariz. 1978).
68. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).




citizens, Indian 'inherent sovereignty' must give way to the power
of the state to enact legislation. ' 7
This is strong language, but it reflects the attitude of the state
courts. The question as to the states' power to tax non-Indians
living on the reservation has been settled. 7' These cases provide
more of a basis for allowing state control. However, when the
state is asserting control over an out-of-state, non-Indian contrac-
tor who comes into the state for the sole purpose of fulfilling a
contract with a tribe and whose business is conducted entirely
within the reservation, the basis lacks sufficient justification. An
excellent example is presented in Tiffany Construction Co. v.
Bureau of Revenue. 72 Tiffany was a non-Indian Arizona corpora-
tion. The corporation contracted with the Navajo Tribe to grade
and drain a road on the portion of the Navajo Reservation that
fell within the boundaries of New Mexico. All work was performed
on the reservation and all the employees were either Arizona
residents or Navajo Reservation Indians, who always entered and
exited the reservation on the Arizona side. New Mexico claimed
that Tiffany owed the state $78,583.03 as a transaction privilege
tax on the project, which totaled approximately $1,681,740.11 The
contact that Tiffany had with New Mexico was found as follows:
"Tiffany enjoyed the use of roads located on the reservation but
maintained by the State, and that it benefited from the New Mex-
ico Environmental Improvement Agency's regulation of air pollu-
tion from the Four Comers Power Plant.74
Several cases have discussed the fourteenth amendment due
process argument.75 For a state tax to apply to an out-of-state
corporation, there must be a minimal contact with the state.76
The Tiffany case illustrates just how minimal this contact can
be." The questionable area develops when there are no real
benefits or contacts with the state except to work on a reserva-
70. Id. at 282.
71. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S.
264 (1898); Utah & Northern R.R. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
72. 603 P.2d 332 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
73. Id. at 333.
74. Id. at 334.
75. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1074 (D.N.M. 1977);
Department of Revenue v. Hane Constr. Co., 564 P.2d 932, 935 (Ariz. 1977); G.M.
Shupe, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 550 P.2d 277 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).
76. Department of Revenue v. Hane Constr. Co., 564 P.2d 932, 934-35 (Ariz. 1977).
77. Tiffany Constr. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 603 P.2d 332 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
1979]
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tion. Driving through the state to reach the reservation may not
be sufficient in light of an apparent trend by the Supreme Court
to redefine minimal contact.78 The state's interest in controlling
the transaction of business within its borders appears to allow the
courts to ignore the jurisdictional status of the reservation." The
states should not be allowed to continue to treat a reservation as
one of its own counties. This attitude presents a substantial threat
to tribal sovereignty and it must be arrested.
The application of the state transaction privilege tax also af-
fects the economic position of the tribe. The tribes are placed in a
situation where they must enter into an actual agreement to pay
this tax8° or the cost is included in the contract price paid by the
tribe.8" The cases consistently hold that the contractors should
not be allowed to escape payment of the tax simply because they
contract with Indians.82 Regardless of where the legal incidence
of the tax falls, the courts have also admitted that it is the tribes
who will pay the tax. 3 In effect, the courts have constructed a
legal fiction which in reality allows the state to collect the tax
from the tribe. Therefore, it is the tribe which is prevented from
utili2ing its tax exempt status and the contractor is merely in-
cidental." '
Another effect of the state excise tax allowance is to create a
double taxation for the contractor where the tribe has initiated its
own taxing and licensing system. The courts have found that this
situation does not result in an interference with tribal self-
government." In Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation v. Washington, " the federal district court held that
Washington's cigarette excise tax could not be applied to Indian
vendors' reservation sales to non-Indians. 7 The court found the
enactment of tribal tax ordinances had preempted the state tax.
73. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980).
79. Department of Revenue v. Hane Constr. Co., 564 P.2d 932, 934-35 (Ariz. 1977).
80. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 438 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (D.N.M. 1977).
81. State v. Central Machinery Co., 589 P.2d 426 (Ariz. 1978).
82. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1072 (D.N.M. 1977);
"The umbrella of immunity from state taxation covering reservation land and income
earned on the reservation by a reservation Indian is not wide enough to shield non-Indian
contractors of its imposition."
83. Id. at 1072.
84. This effect can be compared to the problems with the actual economic burden in
the cigarette tax cases. See Barsh, supra note 3.
85. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (D.N.M. 1977).
86. 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978).




Under these circumstances, the imposition of the state tax did
constitute an interference with tribal self-government. The in-
terference must, however, be based upon a showing that the state
tax would lead to a substantial reduction of tribal tax revenues.88
However, on June 10, 1980, the United States Supreme Court
reversed this district court ruling.89 The Court held that the tribe
could not preempt an otherwise valid state cigarette sales tax by
enacting their own similar tax.9° It appears that the Court was
preoccupied by the fact that the only tribal product involved was
the tax exemption itself. The Court noted that, "although taxes
can be used for distributive or regulatory purposes, as well as for
raising revenue, we see no nonrevenue purposes to the tribal taxes
at issue. ..."9 This language allows speculation that should the
transaction privilege tax be classified as a regulatory tax, the Col-
ville rationale might not apply.
Tribal Actions
If the tribes could establish a regulatory tax on non-Indian con-
tractors working on the reservation, the argument of tribal
preemption might be feasible. The tribes would have to imple-
ment their own transaction privilege tax. Furthermore, it would
be essential to enact corresponding licensing provisions. This
would help to foreclose the state's argument that the state must
regulate all transactions within state boundaries. While these
measures could possibly eliminate the problems associated with a
solely revenue-generating tax, there would be other difficult
issues.
The question of state control over foreign corporations would
have to be addressed. Adoption of licensing legislation by a tribe
might weaken the argument. However, a construction project is
somewhat more complex than the sale of cigarettes. Therefore,
there will be additional reasons for the state to argue that it has a
legitimate interest above and beyond the tribal legislation.
If, however, these obstacles were overcome, not all tribes
would be able to support the economic burden of such a taxation
system. An alternative would be the use of a tribal-state revenue
88. Id. at 1360-63. See Barsh, supra note 3, at 570-72.
89. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 48 U.S.L.W.
4668 (U.S. June 10, 1980).
90. Id. at 4674.
91. Id.
19791
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compact. Under this arrangement the state would collect the tax
and then remit a certain percentage to the tribe. The less attrac-
tive side of this type of arrangement is that the tribe becomes
locked into the state tax system and thus loses flexibility, and
more important, control over the tax.2
The establishment of a tribal taxation system is not a panacea.
It could be discovered that the state tax remained applicable. A
tribe would find contractors unimpressed by the prospect of pay-
ing two transaction privilege taxes. Other methods would than
need to be employed. A tribe could use the agency theory applied
in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey.93 It would be necessary
in this instance that the same type of exemption be available. This
alternative does not appear to offer widespread relief.
Tribes that possess sufficient economic resources should
evaluate their future developmental priorities. It may be possible
for the tribes to establish their own corporations. Not only would
this allow an avoidance of the state tax, but it could provide
employment and training for tribal members. An example is
found in Eastern Navajo Indus., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue.94 In
this case, the Navajos incorporated under the State Business Cor-
poration Act. 95 The corporation produced and sold modular and
prefabricated homes that were designated for purchase and oc-
cupancy by tribal members. The state's tax on gross receipts was
held not to be applicable to this Indian corporation.9"
Conclusion
This area of Indian law is basically unsettled at present. There
are several cases awaiting decision by the United States Supreme
Court. Until certain questions are addressed, the tribes remain in
a dubious position. Even with possible answers forthcoming, the
area will remain subject to the relentless efforts of the states seek-
ing control over reservation projects and monies. Without
specific congressional legislation, the issues will continue to be
decided both slowly and narrowly. The courts have failed to
acknowledge the seriousness of the state intrusion through this
taxation. Until such recognition is reflected in court decisions, the
92. Barsh, supra note 3, at 575, 576.
93. 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1069-70 (D.N.M. 1977).
94. 552 P.2d 805 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).
95. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 51(24)(1) to (31)(11) (1975).





tribes will continue to lose control over their financial assets and
their future development.
Editor's Note: Subsequent to acceptance of this note, the
United States Supreme Court decided Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 100 S. Ct.
2069 (1980). This highly significant case arguably resolves the
long-standing conflict regarding which entity-the state or the
tribe-has legal authority to tax nontribal members residing or
doing business on Indian reservations. For further information
concerning Colville, see Recent Developments, this issue.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss2/5
